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D

orothy Grover outlines the prosentential theory of
truth in which truth predicates have an anaphoric
function that is analogous to pronouns, where
anaphoric is defined as obtaining meaning from an
antecedent. There is no distinct property of truth because the
word “true” cannot be separated from its function in
prosentences. All prosentences contain the phrase “…is true”
and occupy the position that declarative sentences occupy in
language. Robert Brandom expresses the prosentential theory of
truth by asserting that the phrase “…is true” acts as a
prosentence forming operator. Grover wants to assert that it is
not necessary to be deflationary about reference in order to be
deflationary about truth. Brandom, however, believes that a
pronominal theory of reference follows from the prosentential
theory of truth.
I argue that the prosentential theory of truth must accept the
pronominal theory of reference in order to maintain an
anaphoric account of truth. I call the theory that encompasses the
prosentential theory of truth and the pronominal theory of
reference anaphoric deflationism because truth and reference are
described as anaphoric linguistic tools in order to demonstrate
that these concepts are not metaphysical properties. I also
explicate a modification to the anaphoric deflationist‟s account of
truth and reference by explaining that the words “truth” and
“reference” have anaphoric functions in the same way “true”
and “refers” have anaphoric functions. This strengthens the
argument against substantive truth and reference properties by
accounting for these words as having only intralinguistic
meaning.
I. Dorothy Grover and the Prosentential Theory of
Truth
The prosentential theory of truth as presented by Dorothy
Grover explains the use of the word “true” in language in terms
of prosentences. Prosentences are related to sentences in the
same way pronouns are related to pronouns. Both prosentences
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and pronouns belong to the larger class of proforms, which are
used to obtain generality. On this account, the word “true” has
no meaning apart from its function in prosentences. Truth talk
therefore only requires a truth predicate (i.e. prosentences), but
no truth property. All truth talk can be expressed in terms of a
prosentential reading of “true” and “false.” Prosentences are not
redundant because they serve an anaphoric function, but they
are content redundant because of the nature of anaphors. An
anaphor is a word, phrase or sentence that obtains meaning by
referring to a preceding word or group of words. Prosentences
obtain meaning from preceding statements, making them
anaphors. It is important to identify this referring relationship as
intralinguistic (as opposed to extralinguistic) because this
distinguishes anaphors as having an indirect relationship to their
original referent. Thus, prosentences as anaphors are inheritors
of meaning; they acquire their referent from another expression.
Grounded inheritors have referents that acquire propositional
content independently. Therefore, prosentences are grounded
only when their anaphoric referents have propositional content,
and they can acquire propositional content only indirectly
through their referents.1
The two categories of prosentences are “lazy”
prosentences such as “that is true” and quantificational
prosentences such as “it is true.” Both versions of prosentences
can be expressed in different forms because their verbs can be
modified and their subjects can be manipulated. Prosentences
involving the phrase “that is true” are easily seen as functioning
in the same way as pronouns. This type of prosentence is
analogous to a pronoun of laziness. The phrase “that is true” is
used as an anaphoric substitute to other phrases or sentences.
Consider the following:
Marion:
Robert:

Most college students do not get enough sleep.
That is true, but you have to recognize that
such generalizations do not apply to all
students. I always make an effort to get nine
hours of sleep.

In this example Robert did not want to repeat everything Marion
said, so he summarized her statement by saying “that is true.” It
is important to note that the phrase “that is true” is a prosentence
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that holds the place of another content filled sentence. “That is
true” is an anaphor with the referent “Most college students do
not get enough sleep.” Robert‟s prosentence is a simplified
placeholder for Marion‟s statement in an analogous way to “she”
being a placeholder for Marion in the following sentences about
Marion. Marion loves to volunteer her time at the Children’s Hospital.
She is a very compassionate woman. “That is true” is a prosentence
of laziness in the same way “she” is a pronoun of laziness.
Prosentences of laziness do not assert, deny, or consider
anything new. The fact that they are content redundant
illustrates their role in language. They are an anaphoric
mechanism just as pronouns are anaphoric mechanisms.
Quantificational prosentences involve the phrase “it is
true.” These prosentences are used to generalize sentence
positions much like pronouns are used to generalize nominal
positions. The phrase “it is true” is used to corroborate its
antecedent even though it is content redundant with this
antecedent because it is an anaphor of the antecedent. In, She is
Lexi, the pronoun “she” refers to Lexi. “She” is anaphorically
connected to “Lexi.” In this case the subject and object refer to
the same physical thing, but the subject, “she,” is related to the
object, “Lexi,” by an intralinguistic relationship. “Lexi,”
however, has an extralinguistic relationship with Lexi the person.
Similarly in, it is true that Lexi loves ice cream, the prosentence “it
is true” has as its antecedent the very statement it is supporting.
In this case, “it is true” refers to Lexi‟s love of ice cream, making
“Lexi loves ice cream” its antecedent referent. “It is true” is not
redundant because it serves to emphasize the statement “Lexi
loves ice cream.” It is, however, content redundant.
Quantificational prosentences are able to emphasize or
justify because they can have more complex antecedents than the
antecedents with which they are presented. The reason the use of
the phrase “it is true” is a prosentence is that it acts as a
placeholder for all the possible justifications of the primary
sentence. Consider the following:
Robert:
Marion:
Robert:

It is true that water is composed of H20.
Is that really true? How do you know that?
Scientists have proven it experimentally; that
is how I know it is true.
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The reason Robert does not simply say that water is composed of
H2O is because he wants to indicate that he is justified in making
his statement. The original antecedent of “It is true” is “water is
composed of H2O.” When pressed about how he knows this,
Robert admits that it is because scientists have proven water to
be composed of H2O that he claimed the statement to be “true.”
The prosentence “it is true” has a more complex antecedent in
Robert‟s second statement that includes the original antecedent
in addition to “Scientists have proven it experimentally.” When a
statement aligns with one‟s knowledge, the phrase “it is true”
can be attached to the statement to indicate that such knowledge
exists. The stated antecedent and referent to the prosentence can
be expanded to include the other knowledge about the
statement. Quantificational prosentences, therefore, are more
complex anaphoric mechanisms than lazy prosentences. They
appear redundant because their simple anaphoric referents are
presented at the same time as the prosentence, but are not
redundant because they imply the possibility of more complex
referents.
In this light, quantificational prosentences can be seen as
analogous to lazy prosentences. “It is true” acts as a placeholder
in the same way “that is true” acts as a placeholder. The
difference is that “that is true” refers to a specific antecedent,
while “it is true” refers to a specific antecedent that can be
expanded to include other knowledge statements. All
prosentences keep discussions involving truth predicates at the
object-language or intralinguistic level. The word “true” cannot
exist independent from a prosentence and therefore cannot affect
what is said in language. If extralinguistic subjects are being
discussed, then “truth” does not factor into the discussion other
than as a tool of language, as a member of a truth predicate
prosentence. Prosentences that include the word “true” have
anaphoric functions; they cannot participate as an object in
discussion. “Truth” is neutral with respect to philosophical
questions in the same way that pronouns are neutral with respect
to such questions. Thus, the prosentential theory of truth is
deflationary in its denial of truth as a distinct property.
II. Robert Brandom and the Pronominal Theory of
Reference
In order to understand Robert Brandom‟s pronominal theory of
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reference, it is necessary to understand his formulation of the
prosentential theory of truth. While agreeing with Grover‟s
analysis of prosentential theory of truth in general, Brandom
points out an important feature of quantificational prosentences.
The reason the prosentential theory of truth is not a
disquotational or redundancy theory is that it does not separate
the referring property of “that” from the referring property of
quantificational prosentences. When the phrase “…is true” is
understood as a prosentence forming operator, “…is true” is
seen as forming anaphoric sentences where this phrase cannot be
separated from the whole prosentence. This means that “…is
true” functions as an operator in a similar way to existential and
universal quantifiers in logic. The prosentence forming operator
“…is true” is an anaphoric operator because all its resulting
prosentences have an anaphoric function. Brandom‟s notion of
the prosentence forming operator does not differ substantially
from Grover‟s account of the prosentential theory of truth,
because they both assign intralinguistic referring powers to
prosentences as a whole. Using the notion of a prosentence
forming operator is another way of understanding the role of
“true” in prosentences. 1
Brandom‟s move to label the
prosentential operator allows him to explain the function of
“refers” in an analogous way to the function of “true.” In order
to understand his analogy, however, some features of language
must be understood.
There are two forms of reference, word-world or
extralinguistic reference and word-word or intralinguistic
reference. Anaphoric or intralinguistic reference is often taken for
granted as being guaranteed extralinguistic reference through
indirect description. In anaphoric chains of intralinguistic
reference, however, some elements have a purely intralinguistic
referential function and no independent extralinguistic reference.
The following is an example of an anaphoric chain: Robert went to
the store on Saturday. Marion helped him unpack what he bought. They
realized he had forgotten something. There are three areas of
variation to understand in tokens of anaphoric chains. Anaphoric
tokens can be either initiating or dependent. “Robert” is an
initiating token, while “he” is a dependent token (of “Robert”).
Anaphoric tokens are either type-substitution-invariant types,
meaning they do not vary in reference through an anaphoric
chain, or cotypically nonintersubstitutable with referents varying
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from token to token. Anaphoric tokens are also either lexically
simple with words that are nouns, or lexically complex with
phrases that are nouns. 2 Pronouns are cotypically
nonintersubstitutable anaphoric dependents.
Brandom sees “refers” as acting as a pronoun forming
operator when its anaphoric function is understood. When
sentences containing a form of “refers” are paraphrased such
that “refers” only occurs inside indirect descriptions, its
functioning can be explained in terms of a complex pronoun.
“Refers” is applied to a token with a specified antecedent
resulting in a lexically complex pronoun including the word
“refers.” This means that “refers” always becomes part of a
lexically complex, cotypically nonintersubstitutable anaphoric
dependent. Thus “refers” is used to express anaphorically
indirect definite descriptions. Consider the following:
Marion:
Robert:
Marion:

Lexi’s friend seems really nice.
Which friend?
I do not remember her name, but I was
referring to the one who helped Lexi study for
her chemistry exam.

The phrase “referring to the one who helped Lexi study for her
chemistry exam” is a lexically complex pronoun. This clarifies
“refers‟” role as a pronoun forming operator because it always
becomes part of a lexically complex pronoun in language. A
similar relationship exists between “…is true” as a prosentence
forming operator and its resulting position in language as part of
prosentences. This means that reference is an anaphoric tool
much like truth and that there is not an extralinguistic reference
property. The same discussion about truth as a linguistic tool
applies to reference as a linguistic tool.
III. Anaphoric Deflationists on Truth and Reference
It has been established that the pronominal theory of reference is
modeled after the prosentential theory of truth, but the question
of whether or not they necessitate one another has not yet been
addressed. Grover explains prosentences as anaphors, making
prosentences anaphoric referents that obtain meaning from
antecedents. In discussing truth, therefore, Grover is able to
avoid a discussion of extralinguistic reference. Her discussion on
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truth centers on anaphoric, intralinguistic reference, keeping her
discussion at the level of object-language. Truth is seen only in
the confines of intralinguistic use and therefore it is denied that
an extralinguistic or metalinguistic truth property exists at all.
Grover does not deny that truth is a useful linguistic concept.
Rather, she says that language requires a theory of meaning and
that a prosentential “true” helps give language meaning by
drawing attention to what sentences are being used and referred
to in different contexts (i.e. “true” is an anaphoric tool).2
Grover emphasizes that the prosentential theory of truth
does not require a specific theory about extralinguistic or
metalinguistic reference. She goes as far as to indicate that one
could hold the prosentential theory of truth and also hold a
realist conception of extralinguistic reference.3 With the
introduction of the pronominal theory of reference, however,
Grover has to accept that an anaphoric account of truth
necessitates an anaphoric account of reference. Grover attempts
to isolate her anaphoric deflationary move to truth, while
Brandom expands this idea to reference. Because Grover
identifies anaphora in language, and her theory of truth rests on
the existence of anaphora, she must accept all accounts of
anaphora in language. Brandom utilizes the same logic to
explicate the pronominal theory of reference that Grover used to
explicate the prosentential theory of truth. Grover must therefore
accept the pronominal theory of reference in order to maintain
her position about truth. For this reason, I call philosophers who
support any single anaphoric theory an anaphoric deflationist
because they must accept all anaphoric theories. Thus, Grover
and Brandom are anaphoric deflationists.3
Once the existence of intralinguistic, anaphoric referential
relationships are revealed in language, it becomes necessary to
identify all anaphoric linguistic concepts for any of these
concepts to be taken seriously. By identifying “truth” as a solely
anaphoric mechanism, Grover and Brandom invite an
investigation as to the existence of any and all other anaphoric
mechanisms. Brandom‟s explication of “refers” as an anaphoric
operator necessitates that anyone who accepts the prosentential
theory of truth must adopt the pronominal theory of reference as
well. The question becomes not, “do anaphoric interpretations of
„true‟ and „refers‟ require one another?”, because they do. Rather,
what other anaphoric mechanisms in language remain to be
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identified? Kirkham points out that the prosentential theory of
truth leads to questions about the roles of other predicates such
as “is surprising” and “is profound.”4 Rather than liberating us
from false properties, anaphoric deflationists seem to trap us in
language such that it is difficult to discern what can and cannot
be interpreted anaphorically with a deflationary result.
Grover says that the prosentential theory of truth does
not determine extralinguistic reference, but when it is
understood that she must accept the pronominal theory of
reference it appears that she can no longer even use the word
“reference” meaningfully by her own anaphoric deflationary
logic. Brandom admits that the prosentential theory of truth and
the pronominal theory of reference deny any notions of
substantive truth and reference, but at the same time cannot
account for these notions. Truth and reference have been
explained away by the anaphoric account, but it seems that the
reason extralinguistic reference is no longer seen as a property is
because the word “refers” can only be used intralinguistically.
Part of the issue anaphoric deflationism must deal with in
respect to substantive truth and reference are the words “truth”
and “reference.” The prosentential theory of truth and the
pronominal theory of reference are both semantic theories, but
they only account for the words “true” and “refers.” I believe
that when the nouns “truth” and “reference” are incorporated
into the anaphoric account of truth and reference, at least part of
the objection against anaphoric deflationism can be dismissed.
The prosentential theory of truth can incorporate the
word “truth” in terms of prosentences in the same way “true” is
seen in terms of prosentences. When “…is true” is understood as
a prosentence forming operator, “…is the truth” can be seen in
the same light. The prosentences it is true and that is true can be
reworded as it is the truth and that is the truth. Replacing “true”
with “the truth” does not change the meaning of the prosentence,
but rather the emphasis. Consider the following:
Robert:
Marion:
Robert:

It is true that water is composed of H20.
Is that really true? How do you know that?
Scientists have proven it experimentally; that
is how I know it is the truth.

The only difference between this example and the initial version
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of this example are Robert‟s final words. Changing his last
prosentence from “it is true” to “it is the truth” does not change
the anaphoric functions of these prosentences. Rather, the change
only places a greater emphasis on his belief that the antecedent to
the prosentences, water being composed of H2O, is grounded.
This example illustrates that “truth” is used anaphorically in
language in the same way as “true.”
“Refers” is understood as always being part of a lexically
complex pronoun in language. “Reference” can be understood in
the same way, though it will usually be a member of even more
complex pronouns. Consider the following:
Marion:
Robert:
Marion:

Lexi’s friend seems really nice.
Which friend?
I do not remember her name, but I was making
a reference to the one who helped Lexi study for
her chemistry exam.

The lexically complex pronoun in which “referring” is used in
the first instance of this example is manipulated such that
“reference” is used here instead. This enables the pronominal
theory of reference to include both “reference” and forms of
“refers.” The anaphoric function of the complex pronoun is the
same in each instance of this example; it is merely expressed with
different words.
With the words “truth” and “reference” incorporated into
anaphoric deflationism, the argument for substantive truth and
reference becomes even weaker. Previously anaphoric
deflationary accounts failed to explain the words “truth” and
“reference” in language because they only explained forms of
“true” and “refers.” “Truth” and “reference” indicate substantive
properties more than “true” and “refers” do, because they are the
primary nominal concepts from which their cognates develop.
With the primary linguistic concepts of truth and reference
explained as anaphoric linguistic tools, the case against the
existence of truth and reference as metaphysical properties is
strengthened.
It seems unfair, however, that the anaphoric deflationary
argument against discussion of substantive truth and reference
properties is the fact that the words “truth” and “reference” used
in these discussions are not valid terms to use when discussing
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extralinguistic notions. Anaphoric deflationism seems to trap us
in intralinguistic language. In other words, my worry is that the
premise of anaphoric deflationism, the existence of anaphora in
language, does not allow for coherent arguments against
anaphoric deflationism, since no one is able to escape language
and its inherent anaphors. It is a contradiction to say that
something extralinguistic gives meaning to linguistic concepts
when the word we use for this meaning relationship has an
anaphoric function in language. Anaphoric deflationism does not
address substantive truth and reference notions, but its reason
for doing this is part of its premise.
Notes
See Grover, 1992 for a full account of the prosentential theory of truth, and
Grover, 2001 for an updated condensed version of the theory.
2 See Brandom, 1994, chapter 5, section III-4.
3 See Brandom, 1984, section II.
4 See Grover, 1990 and Grover, 1992.
5 Grover, 1992: 34.
6 It may be possible for Grover to accept a non-deflationary account of
extralinguistic reference if this theory did not contain “reference vocabulary”
that could be interpreted anaphorically. As indicated later in this paper,
however, it may not be possible to use any “reference vocabulary” in a nonanaphoric way.
7 Kirkham, 1992: 328-329.
1
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